Daily Current Affairs Quiz for UPSC Prelims 2027 — 21 August 2026

The power of constitutional courts to direct an independent-agency probe, such as by the CBI, into alleged irregularities at a public recruitment examination has drawn renewed attention in recent weeks. In this context, which one of the following best describes the relationship between Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

Why this answer

The correct statement is that Article 226 has the WIDER scope: Article 32 is confined to enforcing Fundamental Rights under Part III, whereas Article 226 lets High Courts issue writs for Fundamental Rights AND 'for any other purpose', i.e., ordinary legal and statutory rights. The claim that both articles have identical, Fundamental-Rights-only scope is wrong precisely because it ignores this extra 'any other purpose' clause unique to Article 226. The claim that Article 226's jurisdiction can be suspended during a National Emergency under Article 359 gets the rule backwards — it is the remedy under Article 32 (not Article 226) that can be suspended under Article 359. The claim that the High Courts' Article 226 power is subordinate to and 'in derogation of' the Supreme Court's Article 32 power is also wrong — the Constitution explicitly states the Article 226 power is 'not in derogation of' the Article 32 power, making the two concurrent rather than hierarchical.

The static concept

Article 32 (Right to Constitutional Remedies, Supreme Court writ jurisdiction, Fundamental Rights only) vis-à-vis Article 226 (High Court writ jurisdiction, additionally 'for any other purpose').

The Tenth Schedule disqualifies a legislator on the ground of 'voluntarily giving up membership' of the political party on whose ticket they were elected — a clause repeatedly tested when floor-crossing episodes surface in state assemblies without a formal resignation being filed. In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of this ground, which of the following statements is correct?

Why this answer

The correct position, settled in Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994) and reaffirmed in Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007), is that 'voluntarily giving up membership' under the Tenth Schedule is broader than formal resignation — it can be inferred from a legislator's conduct, such as publicly campaigning against the party or aligning with a rival group, even without a written resignation letter. The option requiring a formal written resignation is wrong because the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected that narrow reading. The option restricting this ground to elected members only is wrong — nominated members who have joined a party are equally covered by the same clause once treated as party members under the Schedule. The option requiring a prior vote against the whip conflates this ground with the separate disqualification ground under Paragraph 2(1)(b) — voting or abstaining contrary to a whip — which is legally distinct from voluntarily giving up membership.

The static concept

Tenth Schedule, Paragraph 2(1)(a) — Disqualification on the ground of voluntarily giving up membership of a political party, judicially interpreted as conduct-based and broader than formal resignation.

State legislatures have recently moved to align their organ-transplantation laws more closely with the central statute, renewing attention on how India regulates living organ and tissue donation. With reference to the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, as amended in 2011, which of the following statements is correct?

Why this answer

The correct statement is the one describing swap donations: the 2011 amendment added Section 9(3-A), letting two near-relative donor-recipient pairs who are each medically incompatible with their own relative exchange donors so both transplants can proceed. The 'narrowed definition' statement is wrong and reversed — the 2011 amendment actually WIDENED 'near relative' in Section 2(i) to add grandfather, grandmother, grandson and granddaughter to the earlier, shorter list. The 'mentally challenged person' statement is wrong because the Act imposes an absolute bar on removing organs or tissues from a mentally challenged person before death — there is no committee-approval route around it. The 'minors and mentally challenged treated identically' statement is also wrong: mentally challenged donors face an unconditional prohibition, whereas minors may donate only 'in the manner prescribed' — a conditional, not absolute, bar — so the two categories are not governed identically.

The static concept

Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 2011 — expanded 'near relative' definition, swap donations under Section 9(3-A), and absolute/conditional safeguards for vulnerable donors.

The economic fallout of prolonged internal conflict in a conflict-affected region — marked by disrupted highways, stalled infrastructure projects, and deterred investment — has recently drawn renewed attention to how such disruptions widen regional economic disparities within a country. Which one of the following best explains the underlying economic mechanism at work?

Why this answer

The correct explanation is that conflict disrupts infrastructure and deters investment, and this jointly drags down output growth and human-development outcomes — because roads, highways, and connectivity are the very channel through which markets, services, and livelihoods reach a region. The claim that only growth is hit while development indicators stay insulated is wrong: schemes for health, education, and livelihoods themselves depend on the same disrupted roads and stalled project pipelines to reach people on the ground. The claim that conflict-region relief spending 'corrects' regional disparity mistakes short-term security and relief outlays for long-term development spending — relief sustains people through a crisis, it does not build the roads, factories, or institutions that close a development gap. The claim that only the tertiary sector is affected ignores that primary-sector produce and any local secondary-sector output both need road access to reach markets outside the region — a highway blockade chokes all three sectors, not just services.

The static concept

Economic Growth vs Economic Development — GDP/output growth as a narrow quantitative measure, versus development as the broader process of expanding capabilities, access, and reducing regional/income disparities; infrastructure and investment form the shared transmission channel between the two.

Judicial review of orders cancelling public-sector recruitment has recently drawn renewed attention. With reference to Article 226 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice as applicable to public employment in India, consider the following statements:

1. 1.Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs not only for enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also 'for any other purpose', which makes its scope broader than that of Article 32.
2. 2.The principles of natural justice, such as audi alteram partem, are expressly enumerated as Fundamental Rights under Part III of the Constitution.
3. 3.A writ petition under Article 226 challenging the cancellation of public employment on grounds of a natural-justice violation is maintainable against a statutory body discharging public functions, provided the matter carries a 'public law element'.
4. 4.The existence of an alternative statutory remedy against an administrative order acts as an absolute bar on a High Court's power to entertain a writ petition under Article 226.

How many of the above statements are correct?

Why this answer

The answer is 'Only two'. The statement on Article 226's wider scope is correct — High Courts can issue writs both to enforce Part III rights and 'for any other purpose', which is exactly why Article 226 is broader than Article 32. The statement on maintainability against a statutory public-function body is also correct — a writ lies wherever the challenged decision carries a 'public law element', which recruitment by a body like a Public Service Commission clearly does. The statement claiming natural-justice principles are expressly enumerated as Fundamental Rights is wrong — they are common-law principles not explicitly codified in the Constitution, even though their spirit runs through Articles 14 and 21. The statement calling an alternative statutory remedy an absolute bar is also wrong — courts have consistently treated it as a rule of caution/discretion, not a jurisdictional bar, especially where natural justice has been breached.

The static concept

Article 226 — High Court writ jurisdiction (judicial review of executive action) and the principles of natural justice governing public employment.

The judiciary's recent scrutiny of accountability for security-force conduct during civil unrest has drawn renewed attention to India's layered internal security architecture, where different forces answer to different chains of administrative control. With reference to the administrative control of India's police and paramilitary organisations, consider the following pairs (Force — Controlling Authority):

1. 1.Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) — Ministry of Home Affairs
2. 2.Assam Rifles — Ministry of Home Affairs (administrative control)
3. 3.National Security Guard (NSG) — Ministry of Defence
4. 4.Railway Protection Force (RPF) — Ministry of Railways
5. 5.Special Protection Group (SPG) — Ministry of Home Affairs

How many of the above pairs are correctly matched?

Why this answer

The answer is 'Only three pairs' — CISF, Assam Rifles, and RPF are correctly matched. CISF, raised under the CISF Act, 1968, is a Central Armed Police Force under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Assam Rifles carries a genuine dual-control structure: its administrative control rests with the Ministry of Home Affairs, while operational control during counter-insurgency and border duties vests in the Army under the Ministry of Defence — so the pairing with MHA for administrative control is correct. RPF, raised under the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, sits under the Ministry of Railways, not MHA, which is exactly what distinguishes it from the CAPFs. Two pairs are wrong: NSG (the 'Black Cats', under the NSG Act, 1986) functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs, not the Ministry of Defence as stated — a case of misattributing a Home Ministry force to Defence. SPG (under the SPG Act, 1988), which protects the Prime Minister and designated protectees, functions under the direct control of the Cabinet Secretariat, not the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The static concept

Central Armed Police Forces and specialised protective organisations — their administrative and operational control within India's internal security architecture.

The Southern Zonal Council recently discussed the sharing of Krishna river waters between Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. With reference to the constitutional and statutory mechanisms for resolving inter-State river water disputes in India, consider the following statements:

1. 1.Article 262 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to enact a law barring the Supreme Court and all other courts from exercising jurisdiction over an inter-State river water dispute referred to a tribunal.
2. 2.The Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal-II was constituted under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, to adjudicate a dispute among the States sharing the Krishna river.
3. 3.The Southern Zonal Council was established directly through a Presidential Order under Article 263, without requiring any supporting Act of Parliament.
4. 4.The Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 provided for the constitution of the Krishna River Management Board and the Godavari River Management Board to manage inter-State river issues between Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

How many of the above statements are correct?

Why this answer

The answer is 'Only three' — statements 1, 2, and 4 are correct, statement 3 is wrong. Statement 1 is correct: Article 262(2) lets Parliament, by law, exclude Supreme Court and all other courts' jurisdiction over such disputes — this is exactly what Section 11 of the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 does. Statement 2 is correct: KWDT-II (the Brijesh Kumar Tribunal) was constituted under the 1956 Act to resolve the Krishna-sharing dispute among the riparian States. Statement 3 is wrong: the Southern Zonal Council, like all five Zonal Councils, was created under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 — an ordinary parliamentary statute — not by a direct Presidential Order under Article 263, which instead empowers the President to set up a body such as the Inter-State Council, a distinct institution. Statement 4 is correct: Section 85 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 set up the KRMB and GRMB to manage the two rivers between the successor States.

The static concept

Article 262 — Inter-State River Water Disputes adjudication, and Article 263 — Inter-State Council, distinguished from the statutory Zonal Councils created under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956.

Global judicial and arbitral bodies dealing with international law have drawn renewed attention amid recent friction between sovereign states and international courts over the limits of their jurisdiction. With reference to the instruments that establish the authority of the following international bodies, consider the following pairs:

1. 1.International Court of Justice (ICJ) — Statute annexed to the UN Charter
2. 2.International Criminal Court (ICC) — Rome Statute, 1998
3. 3.International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) — United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
4. 4.Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) — Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1899
5. 5.International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) — Rome Statute, 1998

How many of the above pairs are correctly matched?

Why this answer

The answer is 'Only four pairs' — every pairing is correct except the one involving the ICTR. The ICJ's Statute is genuinely annexed to, and forms an integral part of, the UN Charter (Article 92), binding all UN members automatically. The ICC genuinely derives its jurisdiction from the Rome Statute (1998), a treaty binding only ratifying states — which is exactly why non-parties can contest its authority. ITLOS is genuinely established under UNCLOS (Annex VI). The PCA was genuinely created by the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The false pairing is the ICTR: it was established in 1994 by UN Security Council Resolution 955 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter — four years before the Rome Statute even existed — and has no relationship to the Rome Statute at all.

The static concept

International Criminal Court (ICC) and the comparative bases of international judicial jurisdiction — treaty consent (Rome Statute, UNCLOS) versus UN Charter obligation (ICJ Statute, UNSC Chapter VII-created tribunals).

Why this answer

A is true: NCIIPC can notify the control systems of any sufficiently critical sector — energy, power grids, transport — as CII if their incapacitation would have a debilitating national impact, so an offshore energy-linked entity's systems are not categorically excluded. R is false: NCIIPC's mandate is NOT restricted to telecommunications and banking; the statute defines CII by the consequence-of-failure test, not by an exhaustive sector list, so the reasoning in R misstates the legal basis even though A itself is correct.

The static concept

Information Technology Act, 2000 — Section 70, Critical Information Infrastructure and the NCIIPC's sector-agnostic notification mandate.

Why this answer

The answer is 'A is true, but R is false'. Assertion A is true — sustained blockades and conflict in the hill districts have visibly stalled highway movement, investment, and development projects, as reflected in recent legislative statements on the state's economy being set back by a decade. Reason R is false because it overstates Manipur's connectivity: NH-2 (Imphal-Dimapur/Kohima axis) is a critical lifeline but NOT the state's only major highway link — NH-37 (linking Imphal towards Silchar/Jiribam) and other routes such as NH-102/NH-150 also connect the state to the rest of India. Since R contains a false 'only' claim, it cannot correctly explain A, even though A itself stands true on its own economic-impact grounds.

The static concept

Economic impact of internal conflict on regional connectivity and infrastructure — India's North-East transport network and its vulnerability to blockades.