Daily Current Affairs Quiz for UPSC Prelims 2027 — 14 August 2026

The Supreme Court's recent criticism of the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) for delaying front-of-pack warning labels has renewed attention on statutory regulatory bodies. Unlike the FSSAI, which is a statutory body created under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which one of the following is a constitutional body, established directly by a provision of the Constitution of India?

Why this answer

The Election Commission of India is the correct answer — it is a constitutional body established under Article 324 of the Constitution itself, which vests the 'superintendence, direction and control of elections' in the Commission. The National Human Rights Commission is a statutory body set up under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, not the Constitution. The Central Information Commission is a statutory body created under the Right to Information Act, 2005. The National Green Tribunal is a statutory body established under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. The FSSAI named in the stem is likewise only statutory, set up under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 — none of these three, unlike the ECI, trace their existence to a constitutional provision.

The static concept

Article 324 — Election Commission of India as a constitutional body, contrasted with statutory bodies created by ordinary Parliamentary legislation.

A recent disease outbreak among the Baiga, a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG) in Madhya Pradesh, has renewed attention on why disease burden remains disproportionately high among PVTGs despite dedicated central interventions. Which of the following most accurately explains a key structural reason for this persistent health gap?

Why this answer

The correct answer identifies the 'triple burden of disease' — persistent malnutrition, ongoing communicable diseases, and rising non-communicable diseases — which compounds with geographical isolation, limited infrastructure, and reliance on traditional/faith healing to keep PVTG health outcomes poor, exactly as seen in the Baiga outbreak. The option citing '95 officially notified PVTGs' is wrong on the count — only 75 tribal groups are officially notified as PVTGs across 18 states and one Union Territory; the Dhebar Commission (1960-61) supplied the identifying criteria, not a fixed notification number. The option excluding the Ministry of Tribal Affairs is wrong — MoTA is the nodal ministry for PVTG welfare, including health interventions like the Scheme of Development of PVTGs and PM-JANMAN, working alongside states. The option calling PVTGs a 'constitutionally defined category' is wrong — PVTGs are an administrative classification, not one named in the Constitution; it is Scheduled Tribes (Article 366) that carry constitutional status, and PVTG-specific entitlements flow from executive schemes, not a direct Article 32 route.

The static concept

Public health barriers among Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs) — the triple burden of disease, healthcare access gaps, and PVTGs' administrative (non-constitutional) status.

A Parliamentary Standing Committee report on healthcare affordability has renewed attention on India's FDI regime for hospitals and pharmaceuticals. With reference to India's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy in this sector, which one of the following statements is correct?

Why this answer

The correct statement is that 100% FDI is permitted under the automatic route for the construction and development of hospitals. Brownfield pharmaceutical investment is capped at 74% under the automatic route (not 100%) — anything beyond that needs government approval, so the second statement is wrong. DPIIT, not the Department of Economic Affairs, is the nodal department that formulates FDI policy; DEA only notifies DPIIT's policy pronouncements as FEMA rule amendments, so the third statement misattributes the role. Medical device manufacturing is permitted 100% FDI under the automatic route, not capped at 74%, so the fourth statement is wrong.

The static concept

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Policy — sectoral caps, automatic vs. government route, and the DPIIT/DEA institutional roles under FEMA, 1999.

The dispute between the Tribal Council of Great and Little Nicobar and the Andaman & Nicobar administration over a major island development project has renewed attention on the legal architecture protecting Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs) such as the Shompen. With reference to this legal protection framework, which one of the following statements is correct?

Why this answer

The correct statement is that habitat rights for PVTGs are granted under Section 3(1)(e) of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, which recognises a PVTG's customary use of its traditional habitat for livelihood, cultural, and social needs. The claim that this right instead flows from an executive order of the Ministry of Tribal Affairs misattributes a statutory right to an administrative instrument — MoTA is the nodal ministry implementing the FRA, not the source of the habitat-right provision itself. The claim restricting the Gram Sabha's forest-protection duty to villages where individual titles are already settled is false — Section 5 of the FRA mandates the Gram Sabha to protect, conserve, and manage forests, wildlife, and biodiversity in its jurisdiction independent of individual title status. The claim that PVTGs are identified by three Dhebar Commission-derived criteria undercounts — the Ministry of Tribal Affairs applies four: pre-agricultural level of technology, low literacy, economic backwardness, and a declining or stagnant population.

The static concept

Forest Rights Act, 2006 — Section 3(1)(e) habitat rights for Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups; Section 5 Gram Sabha authority over forest protection.

Recent enforcement action against an Erode farm keeping undocumented exotic animals has drawn renewed attention to how weakly India tracks non-native species entering and establishing in its ecosystems. With reference to major invasive alien PLANT species in India and their actual pathway of introduction, consider the following pairs:

1. 1.Lantana camara — Introduced deliberately as an ornamental garden plant
2. 2.Prosopis juliflora — Introduced deliberately for afforestation of arid wastelands
3. 3.Water Hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes) — Accidentally introduced through a contaminated imported wheat consignment
4. 4.Parthenium hysterophorus — Introduced deliberately as an ornamental aquatic plant

How many of the above pairs are correctly matched?

Why this answer

The answer is 'Only two pairs' — pairs 1 and 2 are correctly matched. Lantana camara was brought to India in the early 19th century by the British purely as an ornamental garden shrub, later escaping cultivation to become a dominant forest-floor invader. Prosopis juliflora (vilayati kikar) was deliberately introduced to green arid and semi-arid wastelands and provide fuelwood, but it went on to suppress native flora — the basis of the 2018 PYQ on this species. Pairs 3 and 4 are wrong because their pathways are swapped: Water Hyacinth was introduced deliberately as an ornamental pond plant (native to the Amazon basin), not through contaminated grain; Parthenium hysterophorus (congress grass) was the one that entered India accidentally, mixed with imported wheat consignments in the 1950s, not as a deliberate ornamental planting.

The static concept

Pathways of Biological Invasion — deliberate (ornamental/afforestation/biocontrol) vs accidental (contaminated produce, ballast water) introduction of alien species, and their downstream ecosystem impact.

Automated copyright-verification tools used by large social media intermediaries to manage third-party content have drawn renewed judicial scrutiny in India over their eligibility criteria and potential for misuse against original creators. With reference to the legal framework governing digital content rights and intermediary liability, consider the following statements:

1. 1.Under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, an intermediary's exemption from liability for third-party content hosted on its platform is unconditional and cannot be revoked by any court.
2. 2.An intermediary loses its 'safe harbour' protection under Section 79 if it fails to observe due diligence or fails to expeditiously remove unlawful content after receiving actual knowledge through a court order or a notification by an appropriate government agency.
3. 3.The Copyright Act, 1957 provides for both civil and criminal remedies against infringement, while also permitting limited 'fair dealing' exceptions such as private use and research.
4. 4.Private content-verification tools, such as those used by social media platforms to flag copyrighted material, are statutorily mandated under the Copyright Act, 1957 for every significant social media intermediary.

How many of the above statements are correct?

Why this answer

The answer is 'Only two' — statements 2 and 3 are correct. Statement 2 is right: the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) read Section 79's safe harbour as conditional — intermediaries lose immunity if they fail to act with due diligence or do not remove unlawful content upon 'actual knowledge' via a court order or government notification. Statement 3 is right: the Copyright Act, 1957 provides civil remedies (injunctions, damages) and criminal remedies (Section 63), alongside 'fair dealing' exceptions under Section 52 for private use, research, criticism and review. Statement 1 is wrong — it wrongly claims the Section 79 exemption is unconditional and unrevokable, when it is expressly conditional on due diligence and takedown compliance. Statement 4 is wrong — no provision of the Copyright Act, 1957 statutorily mandates that platforms deploy specific content-verification tools; such tools are voluntary platform mechanisms, which is precisely why courts can now question their access criteria and potential misuse.

The static concept

Section 79, Information Technology Act, 2000 — intermediary liability and conditional 'safe harbour', read with the Copyright Act, 1957 (Sections 51, 52, 63) on infringement remedies and fair dealing.

Renewed debate around Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs) and infrastructure projects in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands has drawn attention to how different tribal areas of India are actually governed — not every tribal area sits under the same constitutional or statutory umbrella. With reference to the following pairs of List-I (Tribal Group/Area) and List-II (Governing Legal Framework):

1. 1.Shompen of Great Nicobar (Andaman & Nicobar Islands) — Andaman and Nicobar Islands Protection of Aboriginal Tribes Regulation, 1956
2. 2.Bodo tribal areas of Assam (Bodoland Territorial Region) — Sixth Schedule of the Constitution
3. 3.Baiga tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh — Fifth Schedule of the Constitution
4. 4.Naga tribal areas of Nagaland — Sixth Schedule of the Constitution

How many of the above pairs are correctly matched?

Why this answer

The answer is 'Only three pairs.' The Shompen of Great Nicobar are correctly matched to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Protection of Aboriginal Tribes Regulation, 1956 (ANPATR) — since Andaman & Nicobar Islands is a Union Territory to which neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Schedule extends, its PVTGs are safeguarded instead by this standalone regulation. Bodo tribal areas of Assam are correctly matched to the Sixth Schedule — the Bodoland Territorial Region functions as an autonomous district council area under the Sixth Schedule, which textually covers tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. Baiga tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh are correctly matched to the Fifth Schedule — Madhya Pradesh is among the states with Scheduled Areas notified under Article 244(1). The Naga tribal areas of Nagaland pairing is WRONG — Nagaland has no Sixth Schedule autonomous district council; its tribal governance instead rests on the special provisions of Article 371A, which preserve Naga customary law and village-council administration. Hence exactly three of the four pairs are correct.

The static concept

Fifth & Sixth Schedules and Article 371-series special provisions — differentiated constitutional/statutory protection regimes for Scheduled and tribal areas across states and Union Territories.

Why this answer

The answer is that both A and R are true, and R correctly explains A. The MTP Rules place survivors of sexual assault or rape (including minors and other vulnerable categories) within the 'special category' eligible for termination up to 24 weeks. Because this eligibility is already built into the statutory scheme, the law requires only the opinion of the prescribed number of registered medical practitioners under Section 3 — not a court order under Article 226. Courts, including the Madhya Pradesh High Court, have repeatedly clarified this to stop hospitals from wrongly insisting on judicial approval, which is exactly why R explains A rather than being a merely true but unconnected fact.

The static concept

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (as amended) + Article 21 — reproductive autonomy, special-category gestational limits, and the limited role of judicial sanction.

Why this answer

A is true: the NGT Act, 2010 gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over 'substantial questions relating to environment' arising from the enactments in Schedule I, and mining that damages a river ecosystem feeding into a proposed Eco-Sensitive Zone squarely raises such a question — the NGT can and does entertain such petitions (as it has done for Kaziranga-adjacent riverbed mining). R is false: Schedule I to the NGT Act, 2010 lists exactly seven statutes — the Water Act 1974, Water Cess Act 1977, Forest (Conservation) Act 1980, Air Act 1981, Environment (Protection) Act 1986, Public Liability Insurance Act 1991, and Biological Diversity Act 2002 — and the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 is NOT among them. The NGT's jurisdiction over this mining case rests instead on the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, not on wildlife legislation. So A is true but R, though a tempting-sounding justification, is factually false.

The static concept

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 — Schedule I jurisdiction, read with Eco-Sensitive Zones under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.